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Criminal Law is a species of political and moral philosophy. Its central
question is justifying the use of the state’s coercive power against free and
autonomous persons. The link with moral philosophy derives from one answer
to the problem of justifying the use of state power. If the rationale or a limiting
condition of criminal punishment is personal desert, then legal theory invariably
interweaves with philosophical claims about wrongdoing, culpability, justifying
circumstances and excuses.
Criminal Law Sourcebook presents cases and materials illustrating the
statutory and judicial practices of criminal law in the common law states of
Australia.
The authors of this book on Criminal Law Sourcebook lead the reader
on an interesting and useful journey through the terrain of research design, they
strike just  the right balance between theory and practice, detail and generality.
Criminal Law Sourcebook is a thoughtful, well written and comparative
study on the common law jurisdictions (New South Wales, Victoria, South
Australia  and the Australian Capital territory) and the Code Jurisdictions
(Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania, and the Northern territory).
It is nice to see the emergence of more works such as Criminal Law
Sourcebook that use comparative analysis to examine developments in the
related Australian criminal laws.
The authors in their introduction do a good job of setting the scene and
justifying the selection of topics. Their intention is to transcend the existential
discontinuities that exist between the states and territories in Australia.
Moreover, the parliaments in each of the states and territories have transformed
the form and content of discrete areas of the substantive criminal law. Similarly,
the judicial interpretations of criminal statutes and the common law of crime
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have expatiated extensively on the abstract and conceptual architecture of
general principles of criminal responsibility and the institutional policies of due
administration and justice.
It is always difficult to do justice in a limited number of words to an
edited collection with a large number of chapters. In this book, there are 12
chapters. Each chapter is introduced by a brief overview of the topic and the
central issue. These chapters are all well rooted in empirical research. The
context for the chapters in Criminal Law Sourcebook is Australian and its
orientation is theoretical, practical and descriptive. This means that the book can
contribute to theoretical and practical debates worldwide.
Substantive criminal law is a global phenomenon and the themes and
issues elaborated on in this book are equally relevant for North America, Europe
and elsewhere. It is important to comment on the quality of this work as a
comparative analysis. Today there is a dearth of comparative legal analysis that
addresses statutory and judicial trends in Australia . For that effort, Rush’s and
Yeo’s work deserve applause. This book is a noteworthy contribution to the field
of Australian criminal law. As we said, this book consists of 12 chapters.
The first chapter is jurisdiction and general principles. In the first section
of this chapter, the authors speak of the general principles of criminal
responsibility because the interpretation of these principles provides one
dominant way of constructing the meaning or value of current criminal law. The
authors note the prevalence of these principles in the cases and their effects on
how the Australian Jurisdiction of criminal law can be understood. In the final
section of this chapter, the authors draw their attention to a number of cases that
have challenged (in Anglo-Australian courts) the reception of the common law
of crime, and the judgments in these cases provide studies of the jurisdiction of
criminal law in Australia .
The second chapter focuses on the laws of theft and larceny. This
chapter is concerned with understanding the basic crimes against property
namely, theft and / or larceny. In the first section of this chapter, the authors
begin with the social and legal history of the law of property crime and the cases
in this chapter, repeatedly return to this social and legal history for their
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understanding of the current law of theft and / or larceny. In the final section of
this chapter, there are questions and responses to them as following :
1. when does the act of taking property amount to an appropriation (or
what, in the law of larceny, is called an asportation)?
2. what is the test of dishonesty that must be used when deciding whether
a particular appropriation is dishonest ? Related to this issue is the
question of who is responsible for the decision of dishonesty __ the jury
or the judge? 
3. what is the scope or meaning of «property belonging to another»?
4. what are the difficulties of proving the requirement that the accused
possess an «intention to permanently deprive» that property?
The third chapter examines deceptive and other crimes against property.
In this chapter the authors concerned with the basic offences of obtaining by
deception and obtaining by false pretences, as well as a number of aggravated
property crimes. Section one of this chapter extracts leading judgments on the
acquisition of property by  a deceptive practice. In section two and three of this
chapter, the authors consider the legal elaboration of the crimes of robbery and
burglary.
In the fourth chapter the authors address the laws of assault. In the legal
construction of the central crimes of assault elaborated throughout this chapter,
a number of specific issues of definition and application are addressed. These
issues arise in each Australian jurisdiction. In respect of each legal type of
assault, they are :
1. the level and type of behaviour that falls within the actus reus;
2. the required standard of mentality and its meaning;
3. the doctrine of temporal coincidence that links the actus reus to the
mens rea; 
4. the availability of the «defence» of consent in the law of assault.
In the fifth chapter, the authors are concerned with the legal construction
of two core sexual offences, rape and indecent assault. The are also concerned
with the formulation of the legal doctrines and what these doctrines implicitly
and explicitly say about the links between law and sexual relations. In the first
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section, the readings address the different levels at which the law of rape/sexual
assault is created and applied. The second section of this chapter addresses the
laws of indecency in the crime of indecent assault. Indecent assault factual
distinction from rape is that the law targets sexual acts where penetration does
not take place. Throughout the readings in this chapter, there is the more
fundamental theme of the law of sexual offences : namely, what does criminal
law regard as a sexual relation and how does criminal law imagine sexual
relations? It is these questions that establish the threshold beyond which
criminal law transforms sexual relations into licit and illicit forms of sexual
assault.
The sixth chapter addresses the conduct of homicide and it is concerned
with the legal formulation of the crimes of murder and manslaughter. The actus
reus of murder and manslaughter is dealt with by the readings in this chapter.
The readings in this chapter return once again to the enterprise of general
principles of criminal responsibility.
At the level of the actus reus, the two general principles of criminal
responsibility are voluntariness and causation. The first section deals with the
voluntary action of the accused. In this chapter, the readings from the judgments
in Ryan and Falconer spell out the specific legal meaning of voluntariness. The
second section considers the general principle of causation in criminal law. The
final section addresses the specific legal problem known as «omissions». This
chapter is concerned with the general principles of voluntariness and causation
in criminal law and the specific legal problems that arise when applying those
general principles to particular factual situations where death has occurred and
the accused is prosecuted with murder or manslaughter.
Chapter seven presents the kinds of homicide. The readings in the
present chapter addresses the processes through which the various mens rea of
homicide are formulated in current Australian criminal law. The first section
addresses the rhetoric of legal psychology dealing with judgments in Hancock,
Shankland, Pemble, Crabbe and Royall. The required mens rea of murder is at
least recklessness and definite intention as to consequences of an action. The
second section addresses the meaning of the requirement that the intention or
recklessness of the accused coincide in time with the actions of the accused
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causing death. This is called the doctrine of temporal coincidence and the case
of Meyers illustrates the demand that the prosecution closely adheres to the
doctrine. The remaining sections are concerned with crimes of homicide which
involve what are traditionally regarded as departures from the common law
tradition of mens rea. In the law of manslaughter and of constructive murder, a
person  will have voluntarily acted in such a manner as to cause death and yet
did not intend, nor was reckless as to, causing death or grievous bodily harm. In
such situations, criminal law builds another mens rea to take the place of the
subjective standard that law cannot see in the facts. There are several methods
that criminal law uses in going about this task of constructing the substitute
mens rea of homicide. The third section provides readings on the law of
constructive murder, or what the common law calls felony murder. In section
four, the readings address two legal types of manslaughter.
Chapter eight considers doctrines of provocation and self-defence. The
readings in this chapter turn to the doctrinal formulation and definition of the
substantive defences. The first section provides the leading and authoritative
cases on provocation, which are relevant to an understanding of the defence in
all Australian jurisdictions. The statutory definitions largely embody the
common law approach. Alternatively, the High court has attempted to bring the
common law position into line with the statutory approach. The second section
deals with the doctrine of self-defence and provides the leading cases for New
South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital territory. In South Australia,
there is a recently enacted statutory definition, which at least arguably is being
judicially interpreted in the same way as the common law approach. Unlike the
other jurisdictions, South Australia  also has the partial defence of excessive
self-defence. The third section of this chapter organizes the readings and cases
in terms of the substantive social issues to which the courts have been
responding when formulating the legal definitions of provocation and self-
defence.
 Chapter nine  focuses on the legal formulation and elaboration of the
doctrine of duress and the doctrine of necessity. Section one deals with the
doctrine of duress.  The starting point of the appellate consideration of the
doctrine of duress is whether, on the evidence before the trial court and in the
current state of the law, the defence should be put to the jury for its decision.
The answer to this question provides the substantive law of duress. One way of
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answering it is to assess and elaborate the proper directions to and summing-up
for the jury on the defence. This approach completely dominates the judgment
in Abusafiah. By contrast, the cases of Lawrence and Howe formulate the
doctrine of duress by expatiating upon the authority, principles and policies of
the common law. Section two studies the doctrine of necessity. The question that
has dogged the courts is whether criminal law recognises such a defence.
In the tenth chapter, the authors have collected readings that address
situations in which the accused relies on a claim that his or her psychological
processes were in some way disrupted at the time of committing the crime
charged. Section one deals with the defence of insanity and the defence of
diminished responsibility. The doctrine and defence of diminished responsibility
is closely allied with the defence of insanity. Whereas the doctrine of insanity
speaks of «defect of reason» and its cognate expressions, the doctrine of
diminished responsibility speaks of «abnormalities of mind». Section two
focuses on the doctrine of intoxication. The primary concern is «self-induced
intoxication» namely, intoxication that is the result of choosing to consume
alcohol or drugs (licit or illicit). Section three considers the doctrine of
automatism. Automatism and insanity are related defences and, in some trials,
their interaction is crucial to the legal dispute. The final section of this chapter
addresses the doctrine of mistake.
Although it is a discrete doctrine of criminal law, it cannot be
understood apart from its formulation in the doctrine of strict and absolute
liability. The general principles of criminal responsibility have been
fundamentally created and formulated by the common law tradition. In common
law, the presumption was that all crimes require proof of mens rea. With the rise
of statutes and statutory crimes in the nineteenth century, the issue became how
to interpret crimes that did not exist in common law but were created by statute :
did the common law presumption of mens rea apply and, if so, how did it apply
to the specific statutory section? The answer to this question is the doctrine of
strict and absolute liability.
The authors collect leading cases on the legal discourse of complicity,
the legal concern is to target the formation of and participation in collectives or
groups – and to attribute criminal liability to individuals for their personal
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participation in the group’s criminal activities. The doctrine of complicity is an
example of the concern of criminal legal practice to widen the net of criminal
liability to cover people on the fringe, as it were, of personally committing
crimes. The doctrines of complicity do not create and define a substantive crime
called complicity, rather, the doctrines create no more and no less than a legal
method for finding criminal liability. Section one begins with an overview of the
doctrine of complicity and its various prosecutorial methods.
Chapter eleven offers doctrines of complicity. Complicity is not a crime
but a method of finding criminal liability in the specific factual situations of
particular cases. The doctrines of complicity construct two such methods.
Section two addresses the first method, which constructs complicitous liability
by reference to the common law classifications of principles and accessories.
This method is primarily concerned with the forms of «secondary participation».
The term «secondary participation» is increasingly used in Australia  as the
generic phrase describing what the common law calls «aiding, abetting,
counseling or procuring» the commission of a crime. This method is applicable
in all the common law jurisdictions of Australia . The final section addresses the
second prosecutorial method of complicity. That method of constructing
complicitous liability is by reference to the more specific doctrine of common
purpose (in Victoria, it is also referred to as «concert» and in New South Wales
as «Joint criminal enterprise»). The second method also deals with the activity
of secondary participation, but liability is not constructed by reference to the
common law classifications of principals and accessories, but by reference to the
distinct doctrine of common purpose. The central issue of the doctrine of
common purpose is how wide or how narrow the law will draw the common
purpose in the specific factual situation.
The final chapter is doctrines of attempt. The law of attempts targets
individuals who try to commit a crime but, for various reasons, do not succeed.
Under the doctrines of attempt, the accused is held responsible for trying to
commit a crime. The liability of the accused is extended beyond what he did, to
what he or she tried to do, and even beyond what he or she caused to happen. In
this sense, the crime of attempt – together with the crimes of conspiracy and of
incitement – were traditionally referred to as «inchoate» crimes. «Inchoate» is
Law-Latin for «incomplete». The substantive crime of attempt is an incomplete
crime. The doctrine of attempts concerns itself with those elements that must be
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proved in all cases where the prosecution alleges that the accused attempted to
commit a crime. Section one deals with the elements of the doctrine of attempt.
The basic formulation of the doctrine establishes two elements that must be
proved by the prosecution when accusing a person of attempting to commit a
crime. These are the accused intended to commit the complete crime, and the
accused engaged in conduct that is «more than merely preparatory» and is at
least «proximate» to the commission of the complete crime. These two elements
constitute the mens rea and actus reus of the common law doctrine of attempt.
The final section of this chapter addresses the question of impossibility. It needs
to be emphasised that the question of impossibility does not give rise to any
additional elements of the crime of attempt. The application of those elements
to specific factual situations is what is in issue in the question of impossibility :
can you attempt to commit a crime that it is impossible to commit? This
question and its response are dealt with in this section.
This is a well informed and well argued book that should be welcomed
as a substantial contribution to scholarship on criminal law.
This book ought to be an extremely useful resource for anyone engaged
in the study of criminal law, and it would serve well as an orientation to criminal
law issues for postgraduate students of law.
Today's observers of Australia  and scholars of crime on that continent
are awaiting this kind of publication. They are interested in understanding new
information and judicial judgments to their studies. The conceptual framework
and arguments in this monograph present windows of opportunity and
challenges that await these readers.
The authors have been held witness to a reworking of criminal law that
has not been seen perhaps since the early nineteenth century.
This book brings together written materials that embody or incorporate
the current and authoritative discourse of criminal legal practices in Australia.
Rush and Yeo have held up an expansive image of its teachers and students.
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In summary, this is a very useful work for academic and practitioners,
dealing with substantive, evidential and procedural law and focused on the
substantive criminal law in Australia . Researchers and teachers can find an
abundance of material that is very informative. Law enforcement will find
judicial judgments and legal discussions of current trends equally fascinating
and useful.
This work is a very timely and informative addition to the literature on
criminal law.
Overall, this monograph is an informative, important, interactive and
stimulating contribution from the perspective of the criminal law in Australia .
It lays the foundations for future scholarly inquiry into unanswered questions
and emerging ones.
Scholars, advocates and law students should buy this book.
